Introduction
The debate regarding the impact of financial derivatives on financial sector stability is a long-standing one, but became more relevant as a result of the global financial crisis. There is no unambiguous answer to this question in the literature. The IMF Global Financial Stability Report explains that the increase in credit transfers has helped to make the banking and overall financial system more resilient and increases financial stability. With a broader and more diverse investor base, credit markets may deepen and liquidity should improve. At the same time, the transition from bank-dominated to a more market-based financial system presents new challenges and vulnerabilities. Rule (2001) explains that the development of the credit derivative market has clear potential benefits for financial stability. Credit derivatives allow the origination and funding of credit to be separated from the allocation of the resulting credit risk. A more efficient allocation of credit risk allows banks to expand granting loans and taking deposits, which enhances portfolio diversification even more and reinforces risk reducing effects of credit risk transfer. Rule (2001) also acknowledges, however, that credit risk transfer markets present some challenges and may carry potential costs. Separating the exposure to credit risk from the direct relationship with the borrower might lessen capacity to monitor creditworthiness. Sellers of protection in a CDS contract have no contractual rights, thus reducing their ability to influence the decision making of the reference company. It might also make it more difficult for creditors, regulators and the monetary authorities to assess the actual credit exposures of banks and of the banking system as a whole. Although credit derivatives are in Rules' (2001) view more likely to disperse credit risk, there is also the possibility that they could deliberately or inadvertently concentrate it.
In the recent years regulators have been largely welcoming the development of credit derivatives, not only because of the more efficient allocation of credit risk or diversification effects but also because credit derivatives increase the relative liquidity of loans. In the past, illiquidity of bank loans has been a main source of banking fragility. An improved ability to sell assets will make banks less vulnerable to liquidity shocks. Instefjord (2003) states, however, that this ignores that banks may change their behaviour as a result of the increased liquidity of their assets. They may take on new risks following a reduction in the risks on their balance sheet through credit risk transfer.
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Instefjod (2003) notes that banks that have access to a richer set of derivatives to manage risk, will also play the risk acquisition game more aggressively. Risk exposures become more attractive, knowing that they can be offloaded through a more active derivatives trading policy. These views are consistent with the empirical work of Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) , who provide evidence that banks who manage their risks in a loan sale market hold a larger share of their portfolio in risky assets than banks inactive in loan sale.
The question that naturally arises is how much of the extra risk will be transferred to outside parties and how much remains within the bank. Instefjod (2001) Clearly, the literature shows no conclusive answer to the question whether credit derivatives raise or lower financial stability. Some authors believe that the introduction of credit derivatives increases the stability, while others claim that banks will change their behaviour now that they have access to credit derivatives. In the current study, we empirically investigate the relation between credit derivatives and financial stability, measured by the probability of default of the 20 largest European financial institutions. We find a negative relationship between the financial stability and the increased use of credit derivatives. Also, credit rating agency Standard & Poor's is found to incorporate CDS positively, but insignificant. In addition, we find evidence that this relationship is progressive and economically meaningful.
Methodology and data characteristics
We will use three different methods of calculating the probability of default: bond spread, CDS spread, and Merton (1974) distance to default model. In addition, we will use the credit rating of Standard and Poor (S&P) to see to what extent they incorporate the use of CDS. In the model, we use the probabilities of default as dependent variable and the amounts outstanding on credit derivatives as independent variables. We use Altman's (1968) bankruptcy prediction model as a source for control variables: working capital to total asset, the retained earnings to total asset, pre-tax income (earnings before tax) to total assets, the market value of equity to book value of total debt, and the sales to total asset. Greatrex (2008) finds that market data, like implied volatility, can explain deviations in credit spreads. We therefore add the implied volatility of the stock prices into the model as a sixth control variable. The seventh explanatory variable is the variable of interest, the amount outstanding on credit derivative contracts to total assets.
Our sample consists of 20 main players in the European financial sector. We obtain the 20 largest banks in Europe, measured by total assets, using Bureau van Dijk's Bankscope.
In this sample, we include only publicly traded banks. Even though the sample consists of only 20 banks, because of the relative size it provides a fair coverage of the European banking sector. Moreover, the largest banks are obviously of particular interest due to their relatively large impact in the stability, and the fact that they make up the majority of the credit derivative market. In 2008 however the average probability of default using CDS spreads is 2.7%, which is remarkably lower than that of the bond spread. The highest default probability is that of Dexia with 6.7%. Both methods use market data so that one would expect the results to be more or less comparable.
The The Effect of Credit Derivatives on Financial Stability Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of both the probabilities of default (a) and the control variables (b). A noticeable thing is the relatively high standard deviation of X7, which is the credit derivative variable. The mean is much higher than the median, indicating that a small number of banks uses a large amount of credit derivatives. Notes: X1 = working capital to total assets; X2 = retained earnings to total asset; X3 = pre-tax income to total asset; X4 = market value of equity to book value of total debt; X5 = sales to total asset; X6 = implied volatility using at-themoney options; X7 = notional amount of credit derivative contracts to total assets. Table 3 shows the correlations between the probabilities of default and the explanatory variables. Between the probabilities, the correlation is the highest between the CDS spreads and Merton DD with 78%. The correlation between the bond spreads and CDS spreads is 67%. The correlation of the default probabilities with X7, the notional amount of credit derivatives to total assets, provides a first answer to our research question. For the bond spread, CDS spread, and Merton DD model, the correlation is highly comparable and positive. This indicates that the probability of default increases with an increased use of credit derivatives.
The credit rating, on the other hand, depicts a negative correlation. As such, S&P views the use of credit derivatives as increasing the creditworthiness of a financial institution. Notes: X1 = working capital to total assets; X2 = retained earnings to total asset; X3 = pre-tax income to total asset; X4 = market value of equity to book value of total debt; X5 = sales to total asset; X6 = implied volatility using at-themoney options; X7 = notional amount of credit derivative contracts to total assets. Notes: X1 = working capital to total assets; X2 = retained earnings to total asset; X3 = pre-tax income to total asset; X4 = market value of equity to book value of total debt; X5 = sales to total asset; X6 = implied volatility using at-themoney options; X7 = notional amount of credit derivative contracts to total assets. The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors; *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
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Empirical results
The estimation results are presented in Table 4 . In this regression the Z-score of the probability of default is the dependent variable 2 .
Overall, we observe in Table 4 that the use of credit derivatives is detrimental to the stability of the financial institutions. This relation is significant in two cases. The probability of default given by the credit rating agency S&P actually decreases with the use of CDS, although not significantly.
Using the bond spreads, sales to total assets, implied volatility, and our variable of interest credit derivatives to total sales, are significant. In increase in sales to total assets decreases the probability of default. An increase in implied volatility increases the probability of default. The coefficient for X7 is negative, so that an increase in credit derivative positions increases default risk and thus decrease stability.
When focusing on the CDS spreads, there are four significant variables: market value to total debt, sales to total assets, implied volatility, and credit derivatives to total assets. The sign of the coefficient for the sales to total assets is minus, though, which implies that a rise in this ratio increases risk, which is in contradiction with the result from the model using bond spreads. The credit derivative coefficient is again negative.
For the Merton model, only two variables are significant: sales to total assets and the implied volatility. The signs of these variables are consistent with those from the model using bond spreads. The coefficient of the implied volatility, however, is much higher than with the other models.
In this model using the S&P rating, only pre-tax income to total assets is significant; all other variables have high p-values. The credit derivative variable has a positive sign, in contrast to the previous models 3 .
To determine the economic impact of the credit derivative variable on the probability of default, we use our estimated models and calculate the probability of default when the companies would have held one standard deviation more credit derivative contracts and compare them to the probabilities from the original model. An increase in the holdings of credit derivatives with one standard deviation would increase the probability of default of a company with 9.5, 18.2, and 8.5 percent for the bond spread, CDS spread, and Merton model, respectively. These numbers can be considered economically meaningful. S&P reduces the probability of default by 2.5%.
So far we have introduced the credit derivative variable as a linear variable in our model. However, it could be possible that the relationship between the outstanding amount of credit derivatives and the probability of default is non-linear. The probability of default could increase more than proportional due to the leverage embedded in the credit derivatives.
The squared value becomes negative and significant for all three measures. For CDS and Merton, the AIC value decreases, indicating a better fit. This progressive effect of CDS on the probability of default could indicate the initial stabilizing effect, and the subsequent destabilizing effect.
In addition, a possible explanation is the counter party risk.
For S&P the coefficient remains positive, and insignificant;
the fit of the model also deteriorates.
Conclusion
Our results indicate that an increase in the use of credit derivatives increases the probability of default. Therefore, we conclude that an increase in the credit derivatives held by financial institutions reduces the stability of the financial sector. This is even more pressing considering the fact that credit risk instruments are typically only used by large, systemic financial institutions. The magnitude of the impact of credit derivatives on the probability of default of the financial institutions is economically relevant. Results further suggest that the relation between credit derivatives held by financial institutions and the probability of default is not linear, but quadratic. The Effect of Credit Derivatives on Financial Stability
